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> ARCHITECTURE CATALOG // V1.0

18 Zero-Trust Reference Architectures

54 Maturity Tiers, Hardware Root of Trust, Kernel eBPF Enforcement & Post-Quantum Cryptography

APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-06

SLSA Level 3 Cryptographic Software Supply Chain

Tamper-proof software supply chain architecture adhering to SLSA Level 3, featuring ephemeral build runners, Cosign keyless image signing via Fulcio/Rekor, and strict Kubernetes admission gates.

Adversary Model:

Adversary breaches developer account or build environment, injecting malicious backdoors into compiled release binaries.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1195.001T1195.002T1554
APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-08

Real-Time Kernel Threat Enforcement via Tetragon

Deep operating system kernel visibility and automated in-kernel attack mitigation using Cilium Tetragon eBPF, killing malicious processes (SIGKILL) before unauthorized syscalls complete.

Adversary Model:

Attacker leverages zero-day vulnerability in container to execute reverse shell, spawn namespace escaping binaries, or read `/etc/shadow`.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1059.004T1068T1611
APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-09

Zero-Trust AI Agent Guardrail & Tool Sandboxing

Zero-Trust defense architecture for autonomous AI agents and LLM tool calling, isolating agent execution behind schema validation proxies, air-gapped WASM/MicroVM sandboxes, and prompt injection filters.

Adversary Model:

Adversary injects concealed prompt payload into crawled web page or customer support ticket, tricking agent into executing destructive commands.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1059T1203T1566
APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-12

Read-Only Immutable OS with Ephemeral Worker Nodes

Ultra-secure container host architecture using Talos Linux, completely eliminating SSH, shells, local package managers, and writable root partitions in favor of immutable, ephemeral node lifecycles.

Adversary Model:

Adversary gains root execution inside a container and attempts to modify host binaries, install rootkits, or establish persistence on disk.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1543T1053T1556
APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-16

Continuous Breach & Attack Simulation (BAS)

Continuous adversarial resilience validation framework executing automated chaos security experiments and MITRE ATT&CK techniques in production to mathematically prove Zero-Trust policy efficacy.

Adversary Model:

Silent policy misconfiguration or firewall bypass remains undetected until exploited by real-world adversary during incident.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1078T1059T1046
APPLICATIONS_WORKLOADSzt-arch-18

Zero-Overhead WebAssembly Micro-Sandboxing for Untrusted Code

High-density, sub-millisecond execution sandboxing using WebAssembly (Wasmtime / WasmEdge) and Capability-Based Security, executing third-party plugins and untrusted customer code with zero access to filesystem, environment, or network.

Adversary Model:

Customer uploads malicious plugin script attempting to execute cryptominers, read memory of co-tenants, or scan local network.

Blocked MITRE ATT&CK:
T1203T1059T1496
AI Summary & Agent Operating Digest
AEO / GEO / Perplexity Indexable

Canonical Zero-Trust Defense per NIST SP 800-207 & CISA ZTMM 2.0: Eliminate static credentials, enforce eBPF microsegmentation, and preempt threats with in-kernel runtime telemetry.

Standards & FrameworksNIST SP 800-207, CISA ZTMM 2.0, MITRE ATT&CK, SLSA v1.0, FIDO2 / WebAuthn
Canon Metrics18 Architectures, 24 Threats, 10 Manuals, 22 Tools
Core Tenet (NIST)Never Trust, Always Verify; Assume Breach; Least Privilege
Agent DirectivesReject static keys; enforce OIDC/SPIFFE mTLS and default-deny eBPF

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the core philosophical difference between traditional perimeter defense and Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA)?

Traditional perimeter security relies on the "castle-and-moat" paradigm: once a user or machine crosses the network boundary (e.g. via VPN), they are implicitly trusted with wide lateral network access. Zero-Trust Architecture (NIST SP 800-207) asserts "Never Trust, Always Verify, Assume Breach". Every request—whether originating from outside the organization or inside a private Kubernetes cluster—must be dynamically authenticated, authorized, and cryptographically verified based on contextual signals.

How does NIST SP 800-207 define Policy Decision Points (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Points (PEP)?

Under NIST SP 800-207, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the logical brain comprising the Policy Engine (which evaluates continuous enterprise access rules) and the Policy Administrator (which issues or revokes access credentials). The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the gatekeeper (e.g. an Envoy proxy, API gateway, or eBPF kernel hook) that intercepts traffic and strictly permits or terminates connections as instructed by the PDP.

Why are static long-lived credentials (API keys, passwords) considered a critical Zero-Trust anti-pattern?

Static credentials lack contextual temporal binding. Once leaked (via GitHub commit, compromised developer workstation, or CI log), an attacker can exploit them indefinitely from any location without triggering traditional perimeter alarms. Modern Zero-Trust mandates ephemeral credentials (TTL < 1 hour) issued via short-lived OpenID Connect (OIDC) federation, SPIFFE/SPIRE mutual TLS certificates, or hardware-bound FIDO2/WebAuthn passkeys.

How does kernel-level eBPF (Cilium/Tetragon) improve upon legacy iptables for microsegmentation?

Legacy iptables scales linearly O(N), causing severe CPU overhead and latency degradation when clusters scale to thousands of pods and network rules. Furthermore, iptables operates blindly on IP addresses and ports without application context. Cilium eBPF replaces iptables with in-kernel BPF hash maps operating in constant O(1) time, enabling cryptographic identity-based filtering, L7 protocol inspection (HTTP/gRPC/Kafka), and automated in-kernel process termination (SIGKILL) without user-space context switches.

What is SPIFFE/SPIRE and how does it establish workload attestation without secrets?

SPIFFE (Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone) is a CNCF open standard defining uniform, cryptographic identity strings (SPIFFE IDs) for workloads. SPIRE is its reference implementation. A local SPIRE Agent inspects the Linux kernel (/proc) and container runtime to attest workload attributes (container image SHA, namespace, service account) without the workload ever possessing a private key. It dynamically injects an ephemeral X.509 SVID into the workload's memory via the SPIFFE Workload API.

What is SLSA Level 3 and why is keyless signing via Sigstore Cosign critical for software supply chains?

SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) Level 3 certifies that source code was built in an isolated, hermetic, and verifiable build platform where intermediate inputs cannot be tampered with. Sigstore Cosign keyless signing uses short-lived OpenID Connect tokens from the CI runner (GitHub Actions / GitLab CI) and Fulcio Certificate Authority to sign artifacts, recording the cryptographic proof permanently in the public Rekor transparency log without developers needing to manage or store private keys.