> ZERO-TRUST // zt-arch-06
SLSA Level 3 Cryptographic Software Supply Chain
Tamper-proof software supply chain architecture adhering to SLSA Level 3, featuring ephemeral build runners, Cosign keyless image signing via Fulcio/Rekor, and strict Kubernetes admission gates.
Adversary Threat Model
Adversary breaches developer account or build environment, injecting malicious backdoors into compiled release binaries.
Architecture Specs
NIST SP 800-207 Tenets Enforced
- ✓The enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all owned and associated assets.
- ✓No asset is inherently trusted; the enterprise evaluates the asset security posture before admitting workloads.
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Blocked
3 Maturity Tier Configurations
Evolutionary engineering configurations from baseline Initial up to CISA Optimal zero-compromise fortress.
Container images signed with private GPG key stored in CI secrets.
Manual verification of signatures in release deployment scripts.
Standard public registry pulling.
Build logs stored in GitHub Actions history.
Keyless signing with Sigstore (Fulcio OIDC + Rekor transparency log) and in-toto attestations.
Kubernetes Kyverno admission policy enforcing valid signature and vulnerability scan.
Private mirrored registry with immutable image tags.
Cryptographic verification logged in Kubernetes audit streams.
End-to-end SLSA Level 3 hermetic builds on isolated ephemeral runners with verifiable SBOMs.
Admission gate verifying provenance, source commit hash, builder identity, and zero CVEs.
Hermetic build environments with zero internet access during compilation phase.
Automated policy enforcement with tamper-proof immutable audit records.
Infrastructure as Code: Terraform & Kubernetes
Production-ready declarative manifests for immediate automated deployment.
resource "helm_release" "kyverno" {
name = "kyverno"
repository = "https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/"
chart = "kyverno"
namespace = "kyverno"
set {
name = "admissionController.replicas"
value = "3"
}
}apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: verify-image-signature
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
rules:
- name: verify-sigstore
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "ghcr.io/tiny-cto/*"
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/tiny-cto/tinycto-tv/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml@refs/heads/main"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"Tamper-proof software supply chain architecture adhering to SLSA Level 3, featuring ephemeral build runners, Cosign keyless image signing via Fulcio/Rekor, and strict Kubernetes admission gates.
Architecture Blueprint FAQs
How does the SLSA Level 3 Cryptographic Software Supply Chain blueprint mitigate adversary threats and MITRE ATT&CK techniques?
SLSA Level 3 Cryptographic Software Supply Chain addresses the following adversary profile: Adversary breaches developer account or build environment, injecting malicious backdoors into compiled release binaries. It actively eliminates lateral movement and privilege escalation by mitigating: T1195.001, T1195.002, T1554, T1059 via hardware-rooted identity, kernel-level enforcement, or continuous attestation.
Which NIST SP 800-207 Zero-Trust tenets does this architecture enforce?
This blueprint strictly operationalizes the following NIST SP 800-207 tenets: The enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all owned and associated assets.; No asset is inherently trusted; the enterprise evaluates the asset security posture before admitting workloads.. Implicit trust based on network location is replaced with per-session dynamic cryptographic verification.
What are the technical differences between the Initial and Optimal maturity tiers?
The Initial tier focuses on baseline policy and identity enforcement (Container images signed with private GPG key stored in CI secrets.), while the Optimal tier delivers CISA ZTMM 2.0 zero-compromise fortress defense (End-to-end SLSA Level 3 hermetic builds on isolated ephemeral runners with verifiable SBOMs.) using: slsa-verifier, cosign, spdx-sbom, chainguard-enforce, kyverno.
What is the primary failure mode risk and how is high availability guaranteed?
The primary failure risk is identified as: Build failure when third-party upstream dependencies lack pinned checksums.. Resilience is maintained through active-active control planes, local cached attestations, and graceful degradation playbooks.
How can engineering teams automate this architecture using Terraform and Kubernetes?
The provided declarative Terraform HCL (main.tf) and Kubernetes policy manifests (policy.yaml) can be immediately integrated into automated GitOps CI/CD pipelines (e.g., ArgoCD, Flux) for reproducible, drift-detected infrastructure provisioning.